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Entergy Corp. v. Riverkeeper, Inc., 129 S.Ct. 
1498 (U.S. 2009). 
Scott Corley* 
I. Background 
Environmental groups and various States challenged regulations 
promulgated by the Environmental Protection Agency pursuant to § 316(b) of 
the Clean Water Act, 33 U.S.C. §1326(b), that allowed individual power plants 
to deviate from national environmental standards.  Entergy Corp. v. 
Riverkeeper, Inc., 129 S.Ct. 1498, 1502 (2009).  The environmental groups and 
States sought review of the regulations that provided this deviation and claimed 
that the agency had unreasonably interpreted the language of the Clean Water 
Act when it determined that cost-benefit analysis was a tool that could be used 
to determine the “best technology available for minimizing adverse 
environmental impact” of cooling water intake structures used by power plants. 
 Id. at 1502–03.  In an opinion by then-Judge Sotomayor, the Second Circuit 
held, among other things, that the agency was not permitted to use cost-benefit 
analysis in determining the content of the regulations, Riverkeeper, Inc. v. 
EPA, 475 F.3d 83, 99–100 (2007), and the Supreme Court granted certiorari to 
review this single issue.  Entergy at 1502. 
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II. History of the Administrative Regulations at Issue 
In 2005, the Environmental Protection Agency promulgated regulations 
concerning the water intake mechanisms used in the cooling systems of some 
power plants.  See Requirements for Cooling Water Intake Structures at Phase 
II Existing Facilities, 69 Fed. Reg. 41576 (July 9, 2004) (codified at 40 CFR 
pts. 9, 122–125).  The power plants at issue produce great deals of heat in their 
operation.  In order to cool the plants, water intake structures extract millions of 
gallons of water from nearby water sources to cool the plant’s facilities.  
Entergy at 1502.  A great deal of marine wildlife is killed every year by being 
pressed and caught against the grates of these water intake mechanisms (known 
as “impingement”) or by being sucked entirely into the mechanisms (known as 
“entrainment”), so the facilities are subject to regulation under § 316(b) of the 
Clean Water Act.  Id.  (citing 69 Fed. Reg. 41586).   
The regulations at issue in this case were passed nearly 30 years after the 
Fourth Circuit had invalidated the agency’s initial attempt to regulate the 
cooling structures at such power plants because the agency failed to comply 
with the publication requirements of the Administrative Procedure Act.  See 
Appalachian Power Co. v. Train, 566 F.2d 451, 457 (1977).  In 1995, the 
agency set a multiphase timetable to promulgate new regulations under § 
316(b) of the act in order to finally establish national standards applicable to the 
water intake structures used in the cooling systems of power plants.  Entergy at 
1503.  Under the timetable, the agency decided to announce rules regulating the 
environmental impact of water cooling intake structures according to the size 
and age of the power plant where they are used.  Id.  In 2001, the agency 
promulgated the first regulations under the timetable and dealt with the water 
cooling intake structures at certain new facilities that had water-flow greater 
than 2 million gallons per day.  Id.  These regulations required new facilities 
with a water-intake flow greater than 10 million gallons to reduce inflow to “a 
level commensurate with that which can be attained by a closed-cycle 
recirculating cooling water system.”  40 CFR § 125.84(b)(1) (2003).  Closed-
cycle cooling systems recirculate the water used to cool the plant, which results 
in much less water taken from nearby water sources and reduces impingement 
and entrainment by as much as 98 percent.  Entergy at 1503–04 (citing 69 Fed. 
Reg. 41601).  These regulations were upheld by the Second Circuit.  Id. at 
1503 (citing Riverkeeper v. EPA, 358 F.3d 174 (2004)).  
The EPA then adopted the regulations at issue in this case. These 
regulations applied to existing power plants that use more than 50 million 
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gallons of water per day, at least 25 percent of which is used for cooling 
purposes.  Entergy at 1504 (citing 69 Fed. Reg. 41576).  Overall, the power 
plants subject to this regulation number over 500 and account for about 53 
percent of the country’s electric-power generating capacity.  Id.  The EPA has 
stated that these facilities are responsible for the impingement or entrainment of 
over 3.4 billion aquatic organisms each year.  Id. (citing 69 Fed. Reg. 41586).  
By promulgating new regulations, the agency aimed to reduce the amount of 
aquatic organisms killed every year by these plants’ water intake systems. 69 
Fed. Reg. 41582.  Under the Phase II regulations, the EPA declined to adopt a 
standard requiring plants to reduce environmental impact to levels 
commensurate with closed-cycle cooling systems, but the agency did require 
plants to conform to “national performance standards” that required facilities to 
reduce “impingement mortality for all life stages of fish and shellfish from 80 
to 95 percent” from a calculation baseline and to reduce entrainment of aquatic 
organisms “60 to 90 percent from the calculation baseline.”  Entergy at 1504 
(quoting 40 CFR § 125.94(b)(1)–(2) (2004)).  The EPA believed these aims 
were achievable if power plants adopted the use of numerous remedial 
technologies that were “commercially available and economically practicable.” 
 Id. (quoting 69 Fed. Reg. 41599–41602).  
The regulation that is of particular interest in the case allows the agency to 
grant individual facilities the right to vary from the national standards if the 
plant shows either that the costs of compliance “are significantly greater than” 
the costs considered by the agency in setting the standard, or that the costs of 
compliance “would be significantly greater than the benefits of complying with 
the applicable performance standards.”  Entergy at 1504–05 (quoting 40 CFR 
§ 125.94(a)(5)(i)–(ii) (2004)).  The environmental groups and states suggested 
that the agency unreasonably interpreted the statutory language of section 
316(b) of the Clean Water Act, which requires “the location, design, 
construction, and capacity of cooling water intake structures reflect the best 
technology available for minimizing adverse environmental impact,” when it 
determined that consideration of the “best technology available” permitted 
consideration of the technology’s costs.  Entergy at 1505.  
III. Chevron Analysis: The “Best Technology Available” Standard 
1. Did Congress Define the “Best Technology Available” Test? 
In analyzing the environmental groups’ claims that the agency 
unreasonably interpreted the act, the Supreme Court applied the test from 
Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 
182 1 WASH. & LEE J. ENERGY, CLIMATE, & ENV'T 177 (2010) 
843-44 (1984) to determine whether the agency’s interpretation of the statute 
was reasonable.  Entergy at 1505.  Under Chevron, the EPA’s view will govern 
even if it is not the only possible interpretation of the statute or the most 
reasonable interpretation of the statute as long as it is a reasonable 
interpretation of the statute.  Id.  In a five-justice majority opinion written by 
Justice Scalia, the Court overturned the Second Circuit’s holding, and held that 
Congress did not speak directly to whether or not cost-benefit analysis could be 
used in formulating standards under the “best technology available” test and 
that the EPA’s interpretation of the statute allowing it to do so was reasonable.  
Id. at 1505–10.   The case was remanded to the Second Circuit for further 
proceedings.  Id. at 1510.  
The Court reasoned that other tests from the act that may prohibit the EPA 
from conducting cost-benefit analysis in setting environmental standards do not 
show Congressional intent to prohibit such analysis under the “best technology 
available” test (the BTA test).  Id. at 1507-08.  While four tests were mentioned 
in the opinion, two tests received particular attention; one calling for the use of 
the “best available technology economically achievable” from 33 U.S.C. 
§ 1312(b) (the BATEA test) and a test requiring the “best available 
demonstrated control technology” from 33 U.S.C. § 1316(a)(1) (the BADT 
test).  Id. at 1507.  The BATEA test was intended to be a strict test that would 
“further progress toward the national goal of eliminating the discharge of all 
pollutants.”  Entergy at 1507 (quoting 33 USC § 1311(b)(2)(A) (emphasis 
added)).  The BADT test applied to new point sources of pollution and was 
intended to promote the adoption of, “where practicable, a standard permitting 
no discharge of pollutants.”  33 USC § 1316(a)(1).  The Court differentiated 
the BTA test from these other tests on the bases that its language was 
distinguishable from the other tests and that it appeared in a statutory section 
that did not provide specific factors to consider in applying the test as the 
sections containing the BADT and BATEA tests did. Id. at 1508.  Furthermore, 
in the Court’s view, the lack of statutory factors suggested that Congress 
intended to accord the agency greater discretion in determining the content of 
the test.  Id.  
The sharpest split amongst the justices concerned whether Whitman v. 
American Trucking Assns., Inc., 531 U.S. 457 (2001) applied in this case. 
Compare Entergy at 1508 (majority opinion) with Entergy at 1518 (Stevens, J., 
dissenting).  The majority ultimately determined that Congress’ silence with 
regards to cost-benefit analysis in this section of the act was not intended to 
prohibit the agency’s use of cost-benefit analysis.  Entergy at 1508.  In 
American Trucking, the Court found that Congress “unambiguously bar[red] 
cost considerations” in setting air quality standards under section 109 of the 
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Clean Air Act by remaining silent on the issue because it had expressly allowed 
for the consideration of costs in other provisions of the act.  American Trucking 
at 471.  However, in Entergy, the Court determined that when viewed in 
context, the statutory silence on the issue of cost-benefit analysis was not 
intended to limit the agency’s discretion in considering the costs and benefits of 
compliance with national standards.  Entergy at 1508. 
2. Was the EPA’s interpretation of “Best Technology Available” 
Reasonable? 
After determining that Congress did not direct an interpretation of the 
“best technology available” language contained in the Clean Water Act, the 
next step for the Court was to determine whether the agency’s interpretation of 
the language was reasonable.  Chevron at 843–44.  The Court reasoned that 
while the “best technology” may be the technology that produces the most of a 
particular good, it also may mean the technology that produces that good most 
efficiently.  Entergy at 1506.  The Court also determined that the phrase “for 
minimizing adverse environmental impact” does not require the use of the 
technology that achieves the greatest possible reduction of environmental harm. 
 Id.  The word “minimize” is one of degree, and when compared to other 
sections of the act which require the “elimination of discharges of pollutants” or 
the “drastic minimization of paperwork,” the simple word “minimize” suggests 
a less ambitious goal, and the agency is allowed to use its discretion in 
determining the appropriate reduction.  Id.  Therefore, although the Court never 
stated that the agency’s interpretation was the best or most reasonable 
interpretation, it did determine that the agency’s interpretation was reasonable, 
and that the agency was thus justified in allowing site-specific variances from 
national environmental standards if a facility showed that the costs of 
compliance are significantly greater than the benefits.  Id. at 1510. 
VI. Justice Breyer’s Concurring Opinion 
Writing separately, Justice Breyer agreed with the Court that under the 
statute, the EPA was authorized to use cost-benefit analysis in determining 
appropriate standards for the water-intake systems.  Id. at 1512 (Breyer, J., 
concurring).  However, the justice wrote separately because he believed that the 
EPA changed the standard it applied in determining site-specific variances by 
allowing variances for a facility that demonstrates its cost of complying with the 
applicable regulation would be “significantly greater than the benefits of 
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complying.”  Id. at 1515 (quoting 40 CFR § 125.94(a)(5)(ii)).  According to 
Justice Breyer, the EPA has traditionally only allowed variances when the costs 
were “wholly disproportionate” to the benefits of compliance, Id. (quoting In 
Re Public Service Co. of New Hampshire, 1 E. A. D. 332, 340 (1977), 
remanded on other grounds, Seacoast Anti-Pollution League v. Costle, 572 F. 
2d 872 (1st Cir. 1978)), and, the agency should have to account for why it has 
adopted a new standard.  Id. (citing Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Assn. of United 
States, Inc. v. State Farm Mut. Automobile Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29, 42–43 
(1983)).  Therefore, Justice Breyer concurred in the Court’s opinion as it 
related to the Chevron analysis but would have remanded the case, so the EPA 
could explain if it had changed its position on when it is appropriate to grant a 
variance. Id. at 1512–15.   
V. Dissent 
In dissent, Justice Stevens, joined by Justices Souter and Ginsburg, came 
to the conclusion that by granting the EPA authority to use cost-benefit analysis 
in some contexts but not others, Congress intended to control, rather than 
delegate, when cost-benefit analysis should be used in setting environmental 
standards.  Id. at 1518 (Breyer, J., dissenting).  Thus, Justice Stevens found that 
through statutory silence, Congress did speak directly to whether the EPA could 
use cost-benefit analysis in setting environmental standards under the “best 
technology available” test, and its decision was that cost-benefit analysis should 
be forbidden under this provision.  Id. at 1520.  Because of the limited nature of 
the grant of certiorari, Justice Stevens did not go into the considerations which 
he believed the EPA could properly use in setting standards under the “best 
technology available” test.  Id. at 1522. 
